DISCLAIMER
Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best avaiiable original In iinmediate reply t o your inquiry, here f o l l o m a brief summary on my thoughts concerning "Strategic \di thholding" (or perhaps, "iluclear Parsimony"). I t i s chiefly neant t o further support the view t h a t there should be other significant doctrines besides "Brute-Force Retaliation".
The basic doctrinal argument i s t h a t i t nay be broadly disadvan-I t tageous t o f i r e one's missiles i n equal, or "total", r e t a l i a t i o n . may be b e t t e r t o reply only s o f t l y , or n o t a t a l l . cation r e s t s on an assumption o f extended war, and on a logic addressed t o vthat's best f o r the s u r v i v i n g population and capability a t any given p o i n t . In most s t r a t e g i c wargame exercises, i t i s rarely apparent that this principle is taken into account.
The basic j u s t i f i -. The essential point of argument i s t h a t an extended war is not so d i f f e r e n t from peacetime posturing. s i l o s remain a greater influence and counter-threat t h a n 200 empty ones --i rrespecti ve of why they m i g h t become "empty", and i rrespecti ve of the stage of the war. I m i g h t change t h i s view, i f I could be convinced t h a t t h e i r expenditure --i n the conventional retaliatory pattern --could reliably b r i n g about a more favorable war outcome, o r a radically higher survival probability. I have never encountered any convincing demonstration of this. mari l y jus t i f i ed as "sel f-evi dent" .
Two-hundred missiles i n t h e i r Retaliation i n k i n d (or i n toto) is often sum-
The usual "logical" discussions o f s t r a t e g i c propositions are quanti t c t i vely quite raw. lines of reasoning s o narrowly constrained, as t o be easily discredited cr. grounds o f speciousness. force" 2 s a refuge from risk and uncertainty. IListrate the logic here, I too must use raw definitions, assumptions and deductions : 4 Sophisticated treatments generai l y lead t o T h i s a t oi7ce also perpetuates "more brute
In order t o further i1-i F i r s t I make the "ow-for-one" assumption: Force parity, ana also parity i n success of counterforce attack. (Any significantly d i f f e r e n t circumstance leads t o "What's the point?" --One way o r the other.) I n a salvo counterforce attack, the aggressor eliminates both his and your forces as significant military elements.
noles. I f he overkills, then our "withholding" makes no difference. I f he underk i l l s , then he's got none l e f t , b u t we've g o t some "filled holes".
Both sides are l e f t w i t h empty I f he miscalculates i n an important way, there are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
Next, consider the other (unlikely) extreme, the purely countervalue salvo attack. (Quasi-extermination.) A r e t a l i a t o r y value s t r i k e only salves the consciences of your dead. I t does n o t revive them, i t does n o t necessari fy eliminate anything of l a t e r optimum m i 1 i tary use, and a p o s t e r i o r i , i t m i l i t a r i l y reduces you t o a par w i t h the aggressor. One r e a l l y needs t o watch the course of the war t o evaluate the optimum commitment pattern --i n targets and time --and this suggests commitm e n t on a parsimonious basis. Now consider the response t o a measured attack --i n other words, i n the context of an extended war. Basically what needs continous evaluation, i s the levels of r e l a t i v e a t t r i t i o n which can be afforded. i n principle, withholding trades your cities and people i n return f o r favorable a t t r i t i o n of the aggressor's s t r a t e g i c forces. very rugged policy t o consider, b u t I will shortly suggest why i t may be unavoidable, in the near future.
That i s a
The mixed eounterforce-countervalue extended war i s an intermediate combination of these patterns --a t least on the basis of a simple l i n e a r arithmetic. I t s t i 11 favors withholding, because i n e f f e c t , the (aggressor) countervalue attack capability is reduced more-or-less in the s a w way as -i t would be by disarmament, and t o the degree that his missiles are assigned t o counterforce missions.
A withholding policy gains significance i n a period o f armament reduction. Suppose we count one "city" as equivalent t o one warhead, and count a country as 200 c i t i e s . I f both sides have 1000 w/h, there i s no contest. force d i f f e r e n t i a l .
I f b o t h sides have 200, withholding can develop a noticeable
Perhaps the most persuaisive case is the mu1 ti -nuclear-pact si tuati on.
(n 2 4) Then the potential Penalties on force expenditure can be severe i)r. Lewis V. Spencer
anaiysis are indispensable i n o p t i m i z i n g force commitment. The vrar cannot avoi d being an extended o w , iili t h much pol i ti cal "back-door" t r a d i n g and " s i d i n g " , and w i t h distressing trad2-offs between c i t i e s and nissi le reserves.
Frugality becones dominant; good intelligence and deliberate
Perhaps the most significant counter-rezction t h a t can develon i n an extended war, i s city evacuatim. I t i s note-worthy t h a t the Soviets make this such a dominant feature of t h e i r c i v i l defense plan. In a matter of three days, the worth of countervalue s t r i k e s can be radically altered by this conceptually siinple action. Having elected ~ a restrained course o f combat ( i .e. , liiilited. counterforce action), one i s then f i n a l l y led back t o the original basic concept of nuclear weapon purpose, i n terms of military value attacks: 3 4 1 Missile E 10 t o 10 bombers.
You will a l s o note that I correspondingly say nothing about c i t y hostage coercion, i n the sense of the political countervalue threat of " f i l l e d holes". s e t t i n g , b u t i t rapidly evaporates i n a "bloody" war. (Quite aside from the evacuation effect.)
That may be a meaningful concept i n a peaceful O f course these are primitive argurnents. They are easily b r o u g h t t o question on such raw technical points as the introduction o f Polaris or of AB1.1. I have a modest collection of such side-notes, which also bear on your broader topic of "HOW t o End Edars"; i f and when I get them organized, I will forward a sequel. If this helps t o extrude a b e t t e r doctrinal rationale --whatever t h a t may be --i t will be a worthwhile 
